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Abstract.
This paper addresses problems associated with the allocation of
a scarce resource--the radio frequency spectrum. It is observed that
the current method of allocation very likely does not allocate the
resource to those most Y luing its use. Because users of the spectrum
are not required to pay the "opportunity cost" of their spectrum use
(defined as the benefits foregone by not employing the resource in its
best alternative use) they are, in effect, being subsidized. Further-
more, there is little or no incentive for them to improve and conserve
their use of the resource. If anything, incentives run counter to
this goal.
A number of schemes to encourage more economically efficient use
of the resource have been proposed. These range from institution of a
free market in radio frequency rights to implementation of federally
administered usage fees. The first part of the paper sets out economic
criteria by which the effectiveness of resource allocation schemes can
be judged, and offers some thoughts on traditional objections to
implementation of market characteristics into frequency allocation.
The second part of the paper discusses the problem of dividing
orbit and spectrum between two satellite services sharing the same band,
but having significantly different system characteristics. The problem
is compounded by the likelihood that one service will commence operation
much sooner than the other. Some alternative schemes are offered that,
within proper international constraints, could achieve a desired flexi-
bility in the division of orbit and frequency between the two services
domestically over the next several years.
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I.	 WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
a. Introduction
Much has been written in recent years about how the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Interdepartmental Radio
Advisory Committee (IRAC) allocate a scarce resource - the radio
frequency spectrum. The interest in this subject stems from the
fact that radio spectrum (1) is allocated in a manner so radically
different from that for most other resources in our economy. From
the standpoint of economic efficiency, this method of allocation is
considered by many to be highly questionable.
The present method of radio spectrum allocation (2] has its roots
in the Radio Act of 1927 (Public Law 69-632), the purpose of which was
stated in the preamble as follows (3].
". . . this Act is intended to regulate all forms of interstate
and foreign radio transmissions and communications within the 	 1
United States, its territories and possessions; to maintain the
control of the United States over all the channels of interstate
and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use of
such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by individuals,
firms, or corporations, for limited periods of time, under
licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall
be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions,
and periods of the license." 	
y
Most of the provisions of this act were later incorporated into
the Communications Act of 1934 (P.L. 73-416), the basis of the FCC's
current authority. In effect, the federal government nationalized
the radio spectrum, .apparently out of the fear that continued unregu-
lated use would result in levels of radio interference rendering the
resource entirely useless [4].
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As "trustee" of the resource, the federal government is charged
with the following significant responsibilities:
Sec. 1, ". . . to make available, so far as possible, to all
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide
and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges"
Sec. 303(c), "Assign bands of frequencies to the various
classes of stations, and assign frequencies for each individ-
ual station and determine the power which each station shall
use and the time during which it may operate"
Sec. 303(f), "Make such regulations not inconsistent with law
as it may deem necessary to prevent interference between sta-
tions and tai carry out the provisions of this Act: Provided,
however, that changes in the frequencies, authorized power,
or in the times of operation of any station, shall not be
made without the consent of the station licensee unless,
after a public hearing, the Commission shall determine that
such changes will promote public convenience or interest or
will serve public necessity, or the provisions of this Act
will be more fully complied with"
Sec. 303(g), "Study new uses for radin, provide for experi-
mental uses of frequencies, and gener 'Iy encourage the
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest"
These provisions underlie the present "modus operandi" of the
Federal Communications Commission. As it is now, the FCC must decide
how, and by whom, radio frequencies will be used [5].
Aside from the issue of the political implications of centralized
control of an information medium (certainly not to be ignored in this
case), the FCC faces the problem that plagues any central allocatory
authority: insufficient genuine information to make intelligent judg-
ments on how to distribute the resource under its purview. This is
not to say that applicants and licensees are not eager to supply
plenty of information, but it is information inevitably colored to
reflect the vested interest of its supplier [6]. Sorting the
2
genuinely relevant information out of reams of data is an
unenviable task often far beyond the capability of an agency
with the FCC's resources.
One place market allocation appears to be generally superior
to administrative control Ir in the economy of information required
to guide resources to their highest valued use (7). No single en-
tity needs to know who has the greatest need or who will make best
use of a resource. All relevant information about the marginal value
of a resource to those actively competing for its use is contained in
one number--the market price, In aggregate, the amoint of information
in the economy can remain immense, but the decentralization of
decision-making eliminates the transaction cost associated with
transferring large amounts of information to a centralized authority,
and tends to ensure that decisions are based only on relevant
information (8).
Owen set out three serious flaws in present methods of radio
frequency allocation and assignment as follows [9):
1) There is no formal mechanism for trading spectrum
rights among users;
2) no price is paid for use of the resource;
3) the criteria by which users are chosen are vague and,
from the standpoint of both quality and economic
efficiency, often counter-productive.
Both the first and second flaws have significant impacts upon
innovation and the development of new services that often follow it.
Spokesmen for the development of new communications services often.
find themselves in conflict with the FCC over whether or not frequencies
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will be allocated to potential new, but as yet non-existent,
services. They correctly perceive that failure to secure frequency
allocations now for future services may preclude those services
from coming into being. Without some assurance that these alloca-
tions can be obtained, people hesitate to invest in development
and construction of equipment that would be rendered useless by
shortages of usable frequencies.
One cause of this dilemma is the effective nontransferability
of either present or future radiation rights (10). Under the present
system, there is often no incentive for old users to yield to new,
even when the new user would be willing to pay the older user much
more than the value that the old user would assign to his unit of
spectrum. If old users perceived spectrum use as having a price,
either because they paid a fee, or because they could have all or
part of their radiation rights bought out by new users, then there
would indeed be an incentive for old services to yield use of the
spectrum to more valuable new services. In such a world, providers
of new services would know that, when the time came, they would be
able to obtain frequencies. The only uncertainty would be over what
the price would be (even this uncertainty could be reduced by an
appropria°;:e futures contract with a present user). From the stand-
point of risk, this would be preferable to the current system,
where the new service has no assurance that spectrum with the de-
sired characteristics can be obtained in the desired amounts, re-
gardless of its willingness to pay the price.
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Certain implications of nontransferability of any rights can
be gleaned from the following proposition, derived from welfare
economics:
If any number of parties enter into a transaction of their
own volition, and if the transaction has only nonnegative
impacts on nonparticipating parties, then social welfare
is unambiguously increased by the transaction.
If there is a nonparticipating party on which there is an adverse
(negative) impact, it may still be possible to expand the definition
of the transaction to include compensation to this party and satisfy
the above criterion. If parts of such expanded transactions are allowed
to be only potential (that is, transactions that could take place but
won't necessarily) then the above becomes the familiar "Kaldor Criterion"
(111.
If transactions of the type above are blocked, as present communi-
cations law dictates that they are, then society has foregone an in-
crease in its welfare. This is the primary reason for the economist's
interest in the shortcomings of current radio frequency allocation
methods.
In a world of perfect markets, all transactions would be of the
type described above (to be perfect, impacts upon nonparticipants
should be strictly zero). Furthermore, when certain familiar assump-
tions are made about the preferences of the participants in this
market (nonsaturation, etc.) and transactions costs (they are zero or
sufficiently negligible) then the resources allocated by the market
will be allocated in an economically efficient manner. This
5
economically efficient allocation of resources is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for maximization of social welfare
(however, within reason, it may be defined. Arriving at this
definition is the essence of the political problem.).
The stated proposition can be applied even when markets are
imperfect, though greater scrutiny of a transaction's effects upon
the welfare of third parties is generally required. The presence
of monopolies may tend to create more equity and externality prob-
lems, but it is still possible, within these constraints, to define
certain resource allocations as being "better" or "worse" than
others.
Besides inhibiting transfer of rights, "zero price" spectrum
use reduces incentive to economize on its use. Thus, spectrum (and
orbit too) is always perceived as being in short supply. NASA, for
example, sets out the coming saturation of limited spectrum and
geostationary orbit resources as the motivation for initiating a
research and development program to open the 20/30 GHz band to use
by communications satellites. Technologies that make use of the
resource more extensive (for example, higher power traveling wave
tubes making higher frequencies usable) and more intensive (multi-
beam antennas, digital compression, etc.) are seen as a way to
increase the resource supply, and thus close the gap between supply
and demand. Others, however, have noted a tendency of technology
based efforts to increase supply to also increase demand, by making
new services possible [121. Thus, the technologist becomes much
like the dog chasing its tail--running faster and faster but never
quite catching up.
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This perceived shortage is a consequonce of tit -0 fact th4 t
no price is paid for use of the resource. In a properly function-
ing nh+krket, no shortage would exist. In such a world, NASA would
see its objective not as closing the gap between supply and demand,
but as lowering the resource cost to the user (or, alternatively,
expanding the number of services that can be offered on a profit-
able basis). Also, there would be greater incentive fcr private
sector users to develop ways to use the resource more intensively,
since this would directly benefit them financially. NASA's emphasis
would probably shift towards (higher risk) extensive development.
Finally, conven , Aunal cost-benefit analysis will tend to mis-
estimate the return on communications R&D. Many of the "benefits"
measured by such analyses are, in part, measures of the cost of	
t
misallocating a resource.	 Many of the services now excluded (or
limited) by the present spectrum allocation and assignment process
z"
may have greater value than some of those included (a frequently	 fi
cited example of what appears to be such a case is land mobile
radio vs. UHF television frequency allocations). Likewise, costs
associated with some high value services now operating will be
overestimated due to their being required to use a suboptimal mix 	 i
of inputs. If the resource were allocated in a manner that was
"economically efficient," then one could be sure that it was only
marginal services whose costs and benefits were being compared, and
that all cost estimates were being based on optimal input mixes.
As it is now, most studies of this sort are largely "stabs in the
dark."
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b, fconoirflta_lly Efficient Spectrum Use
The word "efficiency" is generally used in several different
contexts, often leading to confusion. For example, some engineers
characterize efficient spectrum use as accomplishment of a given
task by use of technology that minimizes required bandwidth, power,
t
and area of unwanted spillover. Under this definition, efficient
use of the resource is identified with minimum possible use, even
though such minimal use would require state
-of-the-art (expensive)
technology across the board.
Another (and l would argue more reasonable) approach to Judg-
ing efficiency of spectrum use invokes economic efficiency as the
chief criterion. Economic efficiency is characterized by optimum
use of all resources required for production of a given output.
Here, "optimum" means minimization of the total opportunity cost
of all inputs used to produce a given output. Opportunity cost is
defined as the value of benefits foregone by not employing a given
input (i.e., spectrum) in its best alternative use. As an aside,
it can be noted that, in a perfect market economy, aggregate oppor-
tunity cost minimization corresponds to aggregate profit maximiza-
tion [13]. If the total opportunity cost of all inputs used in a
production process exceeds the value of output, then the activity
in question is unprofitable relative to other possible activities;.
thus, one expects resources to flow to the other (more profitable)
activities.
Economic efficiency criteria treat spectrum as ,just one of
many inputs into a yi •ven output. Furthermore, inputs can be
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substituted for each other. For example, one can use less spectrum
by using more sophisticated technology, and vice versa. In deciding
how much of each to use, the producer (here a common carrier or
broadcaster) compares the relative cost of each, and then alters
the mix of inputs so as to minimize total cost.
Under the present allocation methods, the cost of spectrum use
to the user (zero, assuming one can get the assignment) does not
reflect the opportunity cost (which is greater than zero, since use
of a given frequency necessarily excludes certain other potentially
worthwhile uses of the same frequency in the same area). The result
of this is that common carriers, broadcasters and other users of the
spectrum are motivated to substitute greater spectrum use, which
they perceive as cost-free, for use of more expensive technologies
that reduce or eliminate spectrum use. At the same time, potential
spectrum users who cannot get an assignment from the Federal Communi-
catins Cormiission (FCC) are forced to substitute alternative resources
in the production of the goods or services they wish to provide, or
forego production altogether. Under the FCC's current allocation
and assignment scheme, there is nothing to ensure that spectrum is
allocated among potential users in such a way as to maximize its con-
tribution to society's aggregate economic product, and good .reason
to believe that it is not.
The solution to this problem is not, as is often proposed, to
accommodate all possible users of the spectrum by use of technology
sophisticated enough to allow everyone who wishes to use the spectrum
to do so. This kind of approach seeks to reduce the opportunity cost
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of spectrum use to zero by substitution of other resources (such
as more sophisticated equipment), but fails to recognize that this
requires an increase in the opportunity cost of the other resources
used in the production of a specified level of output. The total
opportunity cost of all inputs is unlikely to be minimized by such
an approach.
The best (in the sense of economically efficient) solution to
the spectrum allocation problem can only be achieved if the cost
of spectrum use to the user can be made to reflect its opportunity
cost. If this could be achieved, competitive economic forces would
then tend to push spectrum assignments into the hands of those
groups or individuals making the most economically productive use of
the resource.
If the cost of the spectrum use truly reflected opportunity
cost, spectrum use by new industries (such as a Land Mobile or
Broadcast Satellite Service) that proved to be more profitable than
existing uses would drive up the cost of spectrum use to the point
where the existing users would be forced to reduce or eliminate
their use. Thus, new communications services would not face uncer-
tainty about whether or not spectrum assignments could be acquired
that might otherwise stifle their growth.
There are a number of ways in which the cost of spectrum use
could conceivably be made to reflect opportunity cost. Among these
are institution of a free market for spectrum where assignments can
be bought and sold, institution of a spectrum use fee by a centralized
regulatory authority, or some mix of markets and regulation. The
10
4market's approach alleged drawback resides in the difficulty of
defining and enforcing spectrum property rights (although it can
be effectively argued that this same problem plagues the current
system). The drawback to centralized allocation with usage fees
is that an overwhelming amount of information is required in order
to accurately calculate fees that reflect opportunity cost (the
shadow pricing problem).
Nevertheless, definite improvement in the current FCC alloca-
tion and assignment process can very likely be achieved, even
though a "best of all possible worlds" solution may be impossible.
Allowing parties now holding licenses to openly buy and sell all
or part of their frequency assignments would institute market char-
acteristics tending to lead to more efficient spectrum utilization.
In spite of the evident merit of applying such market mechanisms
to the allocation, of spectrum, however, there remain some tradi-
tional objections that must be addressed (14).
c. The Property Rights Problem
It is generally agreed that market mechanisms cannot be
successfully introduced into spectrum allocation without first
arriving at a workable definition of spectrum property rights. It
has been argued that transferable rights for a resource as ethereal
as the radio spectrum could become very complicated indeed. For
example, determination of who is liable for interference experi-
enced by a certain party would not be trivial in the case where the
interference is caused by intermodulation (although, again, this is
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no different from the current situation). However, it would be
premature to conclude, based on this alone, that enforcement costs
[151 for transferable spectrum property rights need be prohibitively
high.
The relatively low cost of enforcing property rights in more
"concrete" resources, such as land, does not result from the defi-
nition of these property rights being any simpler than those proposed
for spectrum. A small amount of reflection on the nature of land
property rights reveals that they are, in fact, a very complicated
set of rights, none of which are absolute in nature. For example,
landowners may keep trespassers out, but not kill them; grow corn,
but not marijuana; make noise, but not so much that their neighbors
can never sleep. Zoning laws make these rights even more restric-
tive. Land property rights are never exclusive in the sense of
society abdicating all control over land use.
It is not so much the level of complexity in a right's defini-
tion that determines enforcement costs, but certainly what the right
entails. If A uses B's land without B's authorization, there is
little doubt that a court will find A liable for damages to B. Cer-
tainly about what the outcome of an adjudication will be tends to
deter events of this kind from occurring. The disputes most likely
to end up in court are those associated with fuzzy delineation of a
right. For example, the level of noise A is allowed to make on his/her
property is generally not well defined. If A's turbine test facility
is sufficiently close to neighbor B's recording studio, one expects
there is a good chance the two will end up in court. Sufficient
12
precision in the definition of property rights would go far
towards keeping spectrum users out of court.
The other component significAtrltly affecting enforcement cost
is the cost of detection. In tiie land rights example, it was
reasonable to assume that B would detect A's violation of B's
property right with high probability at very little cost. However,
if the probability of detecting A's violation (and identifying A
as the offender) is sufficiently low, and the penalty incurred by A
upon being detected is sufficiently low, one might expect A to vio-
late B's right even when it is certain that A would lose to B in an
adjudication.
This last problem can be formally illustrated in the following
manner:
a - state of the world in which A's violation
goes undetected;	 y
b = state of the world in which no violation
takes place;
c = state of the world in which A is caught
and punished;
p = the probability A assesses of being caught;
u(x) = utility of state of the world x.
Making the assumption that U(a)>U(b)>U(c), construct the func-
tion (1-p)U(a)+pU(c). This is A's expected utility of violating
B's right, and is a strictly decreasing function of p. Furthermore,
there exists a p between 0 and 1 such that U(b)>(1-p)U(a)+pU(c) for
all probabilities greater than p. That is, above some minimum proba-
bility of detection, A will not wish to violate B's right. If one
accepts the notion that the perceived probability of detection tends
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to be positively correlated with society's actual expenditure on
detection, then one can conclude that an increase in this expendi-
ture will tend to decrease the number of people violating other
people's rights. Whether the expenditure that maximizes the net
social dividend (defined as the value of the provisions prevented
minus the cost of detection) will be within reasonable limits is
an as yet unresolved question for spectrum rights.
Also, observe that an increase in the penalty for a violation
would decrease U(c) and, therefore, the minimum detection probabil-
ity above which A would not violate B's rights. Thus, under both
the current and market techniques for spectrum allocation, there is
some flexibility in that higher penalties can be, to some extent,
substituted for detection capability, thereby lowering enforcement
costs [161.
DeVany et al. [171 have proposed definition of spectrum property
rights in terms of hours of transmission, in and out of hand limits
on radiated power outside a specified geographical area, and band-
width. The notion is that property rights defined in these "output"
terms would be much easier to transfer in whole or part than rights 	
`i
specified in terms of inputs, such as transmitter power or antenna,
height. In the case of satellites, system performance requirements
a
are already defined in terms of limits on power-flux-density'(PFp)
over specified geographical areas. This closely approximates the
Time-Area-Spectrum (TAS) property right advocated by DeVany et al.,
though additional complications are introduced by the possibility
of interference on earth to space transmissions, especially when the
14
power levels of these uplinks differ significantly. These
additional complications manifest themselves in the form of
the resource called "orbit." Segments of the geostationary arc
in space are the counterpart of areas of geographical coverage
on earth. Any discussion of sateilite systems must account for
both.
d. Spectrum Monopoly
Besides enforcement costs, concern has been voiced over the
strong possibility that markets in radio frequencies would be
largely monopolized by the national broadcasting networks in some
bands, and by AT&T in others, in an attempt to squeeze out competi-
tion. This tendency could be especially severe in the case of AT&T
where regulated rate of return monopoly services could be used to
cross-subsidize services offered in competitive markets. In princi-
ple, AT&T might attempt to squeeze out competitors by buying up
spectrum, thereby raising its price to competitors and reducing the
volume of services they are able to offer. The standard response
to this concern--that antitrust laws can respond to such efforts in
the usual manner--is not entirely satisfactory in a time when many
large corporations have already demonstrated the capability to drag
such proceedings out for years. It would be far preferable to avoid
this situation if at all possible.
On the other hand, there are numerous ways in which the tele-
phone company can cross-subsidize services without resorting to
spectrum hoarding at all. Spectrum hoarding would succeed as a
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squeeze out technique either by completely excluding competitors
from use of the spectrum or by forcing them to charge higher prices,
allowing the monopoly to undercut them. Total exclusion would seem
to make what is occurring too obvious. Hoarding gust enough to
drive up the competition's prices to where they can be undercut
would seem to be a roundabout way of achieving something that could
be more easily achieved without hoarding spectrum (i.e. instead of
buying up spectrum to hold idle, why not just directly undercut the
competition's price?).
Finally, it is not clear that a spectrum market heavily domi-
nated by a regulated monopoly would be worse than the current situ-
ation, nor is> it clear that the AT&T monopoly is any more constrained
by the current FCC from undesirable market practices than they would
be if spectrum were allocated by the market place. There is no
reason to believe that monopoly or oligopoly could not be just as
effectively regulated within the context of a market system as with-
out. This particular objection is largely beside the point.
e. Equi pment Lifetimes
An oft-cited argument for maintaining the status quo is that the
rigidity of present spectrum allocation methods is necessary to pro-
tect the integrity of investment in long-lived radio equipment. The
fallacy of this argument lies in the failure to distinguish between
the "technical" and "economic" lifetime of equipment. Technical
lifetimes may be very long indeed, but it is the economic lifetime
that is relevant in economic decisions. Tax and depreciation policies
5
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in the United States, coupled with the rate of innovation and
resulting shifts in demands, tend to make the economic lifetimes
of most technologies significantly shorter than their technical
lifetimes. Innovation is the computer industry, for example, has
been so rapid that most machines are scrapped and replaced long
before there is any danger of their wearing out.
Economic decisions always involve the comparison of present
and expected future alternatives in the present moment. One does
not continue to fly Ford tri-motors simply because the equipment
has not worn out if conditions of demand are such that the profita-
bility of flying jet aircraft is greater. In fact, one of the
strongest arguments against the rigidity of the present system may
be that it stifles innovation in communications by favoring existing
users at the expense of innovative new users. Airlines wishing to
fly new aircraft have little difficulty obtaining pilots or fuel
used by airlines operating older aircraft when conditions of demand
warrant it, but anybody wishing to offer a new radio service may
have great difficulty obtaining spectrum from existing users,
even when the demand for the new service is high.
f. Indirect Prices for Resource Use
A not uncommonly heard objection to pricing spectrum use per
se is that users already pay an indirect price through their invest-
ment in radio equipment and operating expenses. However, attempting
to apply this argument to other analogous situations in the economy
reveals its weakness. Cars and gasoline, for example, like radio
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equipment and radio spectrum, are both complements and substitutes
(i.e., more fuel efficient cars can be substituted for greater
gasoline consumption, yet the two are always used together). One
would be on very weak ground indeed if one attempted to argue that,
because people must buy cars to use gasoline, charging a price of
zero for gasoline would not lead to inefficient use of the resource.
Based on this premise, one could make a strong case that the govern-
ment should completely subsidize gasoline use for reasons of equity.
If any conclusion can be reached from the ongoing debate over
the viability of spectrum markets, it is that further theorizing is
unlikely to resolve the question. The economic case has been made.
Just as the theoretical physicist must at some point take predic-
tions to the laboratory before further theoretical progress can be
made, so it is that economists, both pro and con, must attempt an
"experiment" on the viability of spectrum markets before confidence
can be placed in their conclusions. Such an experiment for land
mobile radio services has already been proposed by Dunn and Owen
[18]. Along these lines some thoughts on how market techniques
3
could be applied to the assignment of orbit-spectrum to satellites
s
are presented in the next section of this paper.	 a
II. MARKET ALLOCATION OF ORBIT-SPECTRUM FOR SATELLITE SERVICES
At the time the first man-made earth-orbiting satellites were
launched, few expected or believed possible the explosion in the use
18
of communication satellites that has occurred. Yet, problems
resulting from this rapid growth illustrate the drawbacks in the
current method of frequency allocation and assignment. There are
few places where the need for administrative flexibility is more
apparent than in the allocation and assignment of frequencies to
services undergoing rapid technologically induced changes.
From the standpoint of system performance, optimum frequencies
for satellites lie between about 1 and 10 gigahertz--the so-called
"space window." Because this part of the spectrum was already
heavily occupied by the time communication satellites went into
service, only one of the three bands currently allocated to communi-
cation satellites falls within this region (4/6 gigahertz band).
The other two bands (12/14 gigahertz and 20/30 gigahertz) require
substantially higher transmission powers to overcome effects of
atmospheric attenuation. Of these, the 12/14 gigahertz band is only
now coming into use while the technology to make the 20/30 band use-
able remains in the future. It is highly doubtful that the present
approach to frequency allocation has minimized the aggregate cost of
providing all services, both space and terrestrial, using frequen-
Gies above one gigahertz.
Before proceeding with the discus3ion of orbit and frequency
allocation for satellite services, it is necessary to consider the
international context of the orbit-frequency allocation and assigned
problem.
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) allocates fre-
quencies to services on a worldwide basis. This is achieved through
19
administrative radio conferences in which ITU member nations attempt
to arrive at a consensus as to how radio frequencies will be used,
Because its success is based on consensus politics, the ITU
must attempt to minimize the international constraints on domestic
decisions about frequency use within a particular country. The
United States, for one, has traditionally argued for the maximum
flexibility in determination of how a nation will use frequencies
within its borders. Services offered in one part of the world fre-
quently will not even exist in another part. Consequently, strict
worldwide allocation of frequencies would lead to tremendous waste
in resource use.
The U.S. is fortunate in the respect that, within its region
of the world, only a handful of nations are in potential conflict
over use of orbit and spectrum. This contrasts with the European
situation where many developed nations are concentrated withi0 a
relatively small geographical region. Thus, it was tentatively con-
cluded by a 1974 Rand Corporation report that, except for Canada,
the probable demand for satellite systems of other countries in the
western hemisphere (ITU Re; , ion 2) can be met without special coordi-
nation with U.S. systems [191. In fact, most of the orbital arc best
suited for use by South American nations does not coincide with seg-
ments best suited for U.S. and Canadian systems.
If this conclusion is indeed true, then reliance on market tech-
niques for domestic satellite orbit-spectrum assignment becomes a
much simpler political problem internationally than if domestic and
international assignments cannot be decoupled. More is said about
this shortly.	
20
While people tend to describe satellite systems in terms of
the services they provide, it is often useful to think of them
purely in terms of their system characteristics.- High-powered
satellites, such as those being considered for space broadcasting,
offer the possibility of small diameter (less sensitive) earth
station antennas, thus allowing for systems employing many rela-
tively cheap earth stations. Systems in the fixed satellite ser-
vice generally employ relatively few earth stations using large
diameter (more sensitive) antennas and low powered satellites.
Interference between the two types of systems tends to be more
severe than interference between syste4js of the same type. Two
reasons for this are, 1) even though larger antennas have rela-
tively high gains, they also have sidelobes that can be illuminated
by interfering satellites and, 2) when the interfering satellite is
transmitting a higher power density than the satellite transmitting
the desired signal, then illumination of the sidelobe results in
relatively more interference noise in the receiver.
Approaches to sharing between services using the two system
types described have been studied relatively extensively and are
fairly well understood [201. The unsolved problem lies not in how
to share between the two services but in how to determine, tc.n the
basis of future utility, how much orbit-spectrum must be received
for each. If the future demand and course of technological develop-
ment for each service could be predicted with certainty, there would
be no problem in deciding how much orbit-spectrum to allocate to
each service at any given time. The difficulty arises both from the
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likelihood that one service .. -the fixed satellite service, will grow
more rapidly within the next few years than the other--the broadcast
satellite service, and from uncertainty about what technologies will
become available to alleviate sharing problems between the two,
One question one might ask is; Should spectrum be held idle
for the future use of a service that might possibly come into
existence but is not certain to do so? Holding spectrum idle neces-
sarily excludes its use by currently viable services. The opportun-
ity costs incurred may very well outweigh the discounted future
benefits of the service for which the spectrum is being reserved.
It is unlikely that a satellite service expected to come into exis-
tence many years down the road could be justified if this were to
require that a significant amount of usable spectrum be held idle
for this entire period.
At least one person, Dr. Charles Jackson, has proposed a-world-
wide orbit-spectrum market for satellites [21]. Under the Jackson
proposal, orbit-spectrum rights are preallotted to each ITll nation.
Nations may then lease their rights (which specify a band of frequen-
cies and a certain number of degrees of the geostationary arc loca-
tionally unspecified) to the highest bidder through a market run by
an international body (the IFRB). The rent from the lease of an
orbit-spectrum right goes to its "owner." Once a system operator
has acquired enough rights to protect himself from interference, he
registers his satellite system with the IFRB, just as at present.
Jackson's premise is that this approach would defuse much of
the growing political opposition that developing nations have to use
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of the orbit and spectrum by the developed nations without
requiring that economic efficiency be sacrificed. Jackson states
that, "the arguments for the necessity and possibility of a
spectrum market for international satellites are even stronger
than the arguments for the use of market allocation for many domes-
tic spectrum uses. Both equity and efficiency considerations are
involved in the allocation of the orbital-frequency resource. A
well designed market system should be able to separate these two
problems" 1221.
Unfortunately, there is reason to question the last statement.
Much of what occurs in the international forum is heavily colored
by ideology that may not even accept the principles outlined by
Jackson and the first part of this paper. Even if orbital slots
that could be sold or leased were preallocated to every nation in a
manner deemed equitable (a proposal counter to traditional U.S.
positrons), several political problems would still remain. Some
nations, initially finding relatively few buyers for their orbital
rights (and all buyers being from developed nations), might see them-
selves as victims of the monopsony power of the developed nations.
Coalitions of nations might decide that the political advantages
gained in other areas by using their allotted orbit-spectrum rights
for leverage would outweigh the relatively small revenues they might
receive from leasing them to users.
Problems of both sorts above have stalled the United Nations
Conference on the Law of .the Sea for a number of years on the question,
of deep seabed resource development. One can make a reasonable case
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that leasing of deep seabed tracts by an international authority
to high technology companies for a limited term of years at a
price roughly approximating the economic rent of the activity is
an equitable wiy to proceed with the development of deep seabed
rc,ources, espc-.ially when the proceeds from the lease are redis-
tributed to lesser developed nations. However, it is only recently,
after several years of negotiation, that some of the lesser developed
nations have begun to acknowledge that only the economic rent, and
not the entire revenue, from these activities should be subject to
redistribution. Many nations, seeing that they have little to gain
at best from deep seabed resource development, have sought to use
the issue for political leverage. There is reason to believe that
much of the same kind of thing would make implementation of the
Jackson proposal on a worldwide scale difficult, regardless of merit.
However, it might be possible, as will be discussed, to employ a
regional or even domestic variation of the Jackson plan.
At present, three approaches to allocation of the 11.7 to 12.7
GHz (downlink) band appear to have reasonable probabilities for
adoption in ITU Region 2:
1. Rigid Allotment Plan with EIRP's, orbital spacing,
frequency assignments specified; slots, channels
assigned to nations.
2. Continuation of first-come, first-served principle;
fixed and broadcasting satellites sharing the band,
broadcasting satellites constrained to orbital arc
segments from 750 - 950 W (North America) and 1400
- 170° W.
V
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3. Continuation of first-come, first-served
principle, separation of services by frequency.
The third approach listed characterizes the expected U.S.
position at the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference. How-
ever, there are two ways to divide fixed and broadcast satellite
services by frequency, only one of which is acceptable to U.S.
interests. For example, the FCC's Tenth Notice of Inquiry (Docket
20271) recommended that the broadcasting satellite service be given
a primary allocation in the 12.2 to 12.75 gigahertz ban g (shared
with terrestrial fixed and broadcasting services), and that the
fixed satellite service be given a primary allocation in the 11.7
to 12.2 gigahertz band. This arrangement would require either a
power-flux-density limit on broadcasting satellites or a detailed
frequency coordination plan between broadcasting satellites and
terrestrial services, and would cause"dedreased geographical flexi-
bility. Too stringent power-flux-density limits might preclude the
i
use of earth terminals small enough for low-cost direct satellite-
,
to-home broadcasting.
While some (mostly Region 2 countries interested in satellites
primarily for broadcasting) deem this last aspect to be bad, the econ-
omist would note that if the value of the additional fixed satellite
services that can be offered because of power-flux-density limitations
outweighs the additional value of direct broadcasting from satellite
to home (as opposed, for example, to broadcast from satellite to
community area TV reception stations) then this would be the economi-
cally efficient solution. High powered broadcast satellites required
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for direct broadcast may require the use of more orbit and spectrum
than is justified by the additional aggregate economic value.
Lower powered broadcast satellites broadcasting to community area
TV reception stations would generally allow more fixed satellite
services to be offered in the same segment of orbit.
Although this latter solution very likely is the one that maxi-
mizes the aggregate economic value of the services using the band,
most of the benefits from this approach accrue to nations not wish-
ing to use broadcast satellites (mostly developed nations). Even
though aggregate economic value is maximized, all parties may not
be better off than under alternative schemes. Unless some way is
found to redistribute benefits among nations (Jackson's satellite
market being one possibility) under the plan proposed by the U.S.,
stiff opposition can be expected.
An alternative suggested allocation includes both broadcasting
and fixed satellites in the 11.7 to 12.75 gigahertz band, with
higher powered satellites (i.e., broadcasting) initially assigned
to the 11.7 and 12.2 band and lower powered satellites (in the fixed
satellite service) initially assigned to the 12.,2 to 12.75 gigahertz
band. It has been argued that this proposal makes (technically)
efficient use of the orbit and spectrum by grouping satellites of
similar characteristics and initially constraining higher powered
satellites to those frequencies shared with few terrestrial services
(making sharing with terrestrial services easier). One objection to
this flexible assignment scheme is that accommodations for broadcast-
ing satellites could disappear if faster-growing fixed satellite
V ;
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services end up requiring the lower part of the band as well.
Allowing the fixed satellite service to use the lower part of the
band at all may incur international opposition from other Region 2
countries wishing to use this part of the band only for broadcasting
satellites. On the other hand, insistence by these countries that the
11.7 to 12.2 gigahertz band be held idle indefinitely, even in the
face of expanding demand for fixed satellite services, might be
unacceptable to the U.S., and very likely economically inefficient.
If frequency division of the sort proposed by the U.S. is not
adopted at WARC 79 (and this is considered by many to be unlikely),
then the U.S. will be faced with the likelihood of an orbit segmen-
tation plan (approach #2 above) or an even less desirable allotment
plan (approach #1). One conclusion from the preceding discussion
is that, however undesirable the approach ultimately adopted is, the
U.S. would be much better off if the orbit-spectrum rights adopted
are marketable (transferable) than if they are not. Then, at least,
the FCC could go into the world market to buy them or lease them
from other nations, if the domestic demand for satellite services
warranted their doing so. If the adoption of a rigid plan appears
imminent, it might be in the best interest of the U.S. (and other
nations with similar concerns) to push for a regional market
approach.
Even if such an approach proves to be infeasible throughout
Region 2, it might still be feasible for a limited number of nations
(i.e., Canada, the U.S., Mexico, Brazil) to collude and pool their
allotments in order to achieve the maximum economic value from their
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allotments (the market scheme would have to, of course, distri-
bute rents so that each participating party is better off than
they would be without such an agreement, but this is one thing
the market is well suited for). Mexico, for example, could lease
their slots to a foreign party until they were ready to use it
themselves (thus, making both better off). Even if no other
nations wished to participate in such a scheme, the U.S. could
still employ the market approach in domestic distribution of its
allotment. Three approaches that could be employed domestically
or regionally are described in the following pages:
Policy Option 1 - A Domestic or Regional Market for Orbital Slots
Orbit-spectrum slots are auctioned to the highest bidder. These
assignments may then be bought and sold between services if no affected
parties are bypassed. The rights auctioned could be defined in a man-
ner similar to the Time-Area-Spectrum right proposed by DeVany It al.,
but would have both earth to space and space to earth components. On
the space to earth component, both in band and out of band maximum
permissible power-flux-densities could be stated for areas outside the
designated geographical area of coverage (with the out of band limit
applying within this area as well). The earth to space component
would have analogous limits (not necessarily the same) on in band
power levels outside the designated portion of the geostationary arc
and out of band power levels generally.
Rights bought by the highest bidder would be perpetual, but
transferable. As long as nobody else's rights are affected, parties
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could even agree to alter power-flux-density limits as well as the
amount of the earth ' s surface and geostationary arc designated by
the right 1231. Furthermore, the relatively small number of systems
v1uld make enforcement of these rights fairly easy. Thus, the fixed
satellite services, which would presumably be the initial rights
holder, could at a later date, within the limits of their ability to
share their assignment with a broadcasting party, sell all or part
of their rights to a broadcasting party for a sum of money. The
broadcasting party would presumably buy up additional orbit -spectrum
rights from fixed service parties as long as their marginal revenue
product from use of the resource exceeded that for the fixed satellite
service.
Policy 0etion^2 - Administered Total Services Discounted
Cost Minimization
The idea in this proposal is that both satellite services-share
frequency allocations and any time a new system, whether broadcasting
or fixed, is proposed, the FCC (or the relevant multinational
regulatory authority) must include this additional system in the avail-
able orbit -spectrum at the lowest aggregate cost over all users. This
approach might require the new system to employ more expensive (spectrum
conserving) technology than had been anticipated. It could also require
previous systems using equipment requiring much orbit-spectrum to change
equipment. Which systems must change equipment depends on what combi-
nation of changes admits the new system at the lowest aggregate cost.
This policy option is essentially the approach proposed by Lusignan
and Russell, in which the party that saves the most gigahertz -degrees
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per dollar expended is the party required to conserve spectrum.
It differs from coordination (the current procedure for transfer
of orbit-spectrum rights) in the respect that no transfer payments
between parties need take plane for the efficiency of use to be
improved. Thus, earlier users need not receive scarcity rents at
the expense of later users, as is now the case. Unfortunately, in
order for the Lusignan-Russell scheme to work, regulatory authori-
ties must have all the information about technological options and
costs available for each satellite system. It is questionable
whether this is even remotely possible, and it is the author's
opinion that the information problems associated with administra-
tive remedies in general probably make the Lusignan-Russell proposal
less attractive than the other more market-oriented policy options
presented in this paper.
Policy Option 3 - Leased Rights Distributed by Auction
This proposal is similar to Option 1, except that rights are
leased by the central authority rather than sold outright. In fact,
the two could be mixed in a hybrid "bonus bid/royalty" scheme if
this were deemed desirable.
The lease rate would be a floating rate adjusting continuously
to the market value of assignments in the relevant part of the spec-
trum. This, unlike the outright market sale, would ensure that the
governing authority accrues all "windfalls" (which, however, could
be negative should the market price decline).
One argument favoring this approach over the outright market
sale is that bureaucratic organizations would be much more prone to
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reexamine their resource needs if they leased rather than bought
spectrum. On the other hand, leasing at a floating rate would
burden the user with uncertainty over future prices that would not
be faced in an outright sale. Businesses will generally pay a pre-
mium to reduce uncertainty about the environment in which they
expect to be operating, especially when they are contemplating
longer-term investments. Furthermore, prices would have to increase
dramatically for a true windfall to occur in an outright sale of
spectrum assignments. Nevertheless, this option offers an alterna-
tive for those who feel that any kind of windfall accruing to a pri-
vate party under any conditions is unacceptable.
In fact, the choice of lease or sell could conceivably be based
on the particular nature of the parties involved. Alternatively,
leasing together with encouragement of options or futures contracts
could be employed. Under either system, coalitions of parties offer- 	
f
ing different services that could share an assignment would be capa-
ble of offering higher bids than a single service that excluded the
use of all other services -from that part of the orbit spectrum. Both
would tend to lead to more efficient use of the resource.
Several observations can be made about the three policy options
described above. First, economic efficiency need not be coupled to
distributional equity. In fact, because economically efficient use
maximizes the aggregate economic value derived, it is possible that
nations participating in an economically efficient allocation scheme
could all be better off than they would be under an inefficient
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alternative (such as nontransferable nation by nation assignment
of channels and orbital slots). This last observation suggests
the possibility of multilateral collusion to adopt market or quasi-
market techniques in ITU Region 2 for assignment of orbit-spectrum.
Such a scheme could even be embedded by agreeing nations within
the rigid plan being advocated by some nations, provided transfera-
bility of allotted orbital slots or frequencies is maintained. Such
an approach should be examined as a possible fallback, should U.S.
positions at WARC 79, or at the proposed 1983 Region 2 conference
be rejected.
A more important observation is that all three schemes give
the designers/operators of satellite systems the incentives to
make correct trade-offs between technology and orbit-spectrum re-
source use-4 ncentives that are either absent or distorted in the
present (zero-price rationing) administrative approach. Instilling
the correct incentives will , be especially important if the number of
satellite orbital slots available to the U.S. is severely limited
by international orbit-wide planning. In fact, it is possible that
the same mechanisms that instill these incentives (payment of scar-
city rent by users) could play a role in reducing the attractiveness
of such worldwide planning even to those nations most enamoured with
it. Once the appearance of users getting something for nothing is
eliminated, the international political interest in orbit-spectrum
assignment might disappear.
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III. EPILOGUE
Orbit-Spectrum is the only commercially useful space resource
developed by mankind so far, but, hopefully, not the last. For
those who believe other space resources will indeed be developed,
orbit-spectrum serves as a useful prototype highlighting some of
the problems development of other space resources can expect to
encounter.
Fifty years ago, orbit-spectrum was a worthless resource.
Today, this is far from being the case, as the continuing political
conflict between nations over its allocation so vividly illustrates.
Many of the lesser-developed nations have demanded that they be
apportioned their fair share of the resource, even though they have
no real intention of using it themselves. But, what made this once
worthless resource so valuable?
The answer to this last question is, of course, technology--
specifically, technology developed by a handful of industralized
nations. One might argue that, since orbit-spectrum is a nondeplet-
able resource made useful only by the investment of these nations,
•	 it is only fair that they use it as they see fit. According to this
view, leasing of orbital slots through an international authority
would lead to accrual of economic rents by lesser developed countries
(LDC's) not truly earned--thus, a leasing arrangement would be really
quite generous to the LDC's.
Unfortunately, the LDC's don't see it this way. Some believe,
rightly or wrongly, that the wealth of the industrialized nations was
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accumulated by exploitation of what are now lesser developed
nations ' during the colonial period. They view orbit-spectrum as
one of many "common heritage" resources (i.e., not by their loca-
tion naturally belonging to any one nation) that should be evenly
distributed among the nations of the earth, but are likely to be
appropriated by the (first-come) industrial' nations. That the
resource is now rationed free of charge strongly reinforces the
plausibility of the view that a "common heritage" resource is being
unjustly appropriated by the industrialized nations.
An international leasing market would result in income redistri-
bution that might defuse the militance characterizing some LDC's
recently but not destroy the incentives of the industralized nations
to continue technological development improving resource utilization.
It would be naive to believe, given what has transpired in the
case of the first renewable space resource, that the U.S. would not
receive a great deal of political heat for exploiting nonrenewable
space resources, such as space minerals. Any future "space policy"
must be prepared to address this problem on at least the rhetorical
level, though it's not so far-fetched to imagine world politics
leading to the creation of an international authority to lease space
mineral rights [261.
The other question of interest only briefly discussed in the
body of the paper concerns how the channeling of research and devel-
opment funds is affected by the assessment of a resource's value.
Because there are not market prices for "orbit-spectrum," there is
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a tendency to improperly compare different parts of the same
resource. For example, the 30/20 gigahertz band is not as
easily usable (hence valuable) as the 6/4 band. Yet, the two
are described as almost perfect substitutes in R&D discussions.
Proper valuation would give a better measure of the return on
both extensive and intensive development, and thereby a better
idea of where to spend public R&D moneys.
+ R
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Notes
1. Rather arbitrarily defined as frequencies between 0 and 300
gigahertz (GHz). 1 gigahertz n 1 billion cycles per second.
2. The word "allocation" has two meanings in this paper. The
usual meaning refers to the distribution of economic resources
in general. The specific meaning refers to the process by
which classes of services are allotted a region within the
spectrum. It is hoped that which meaning is intended will be
clear from the context.
3. Section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934 contains essen-
tially the same language.
4. Ronald Coase argues that the Congress overreacted by passing
the Radio Act of 1927, adopting a solution far more encom-
passing than avoidance of destructive interference required.
He argues that the courts would have, in time, arrived at a
workable definition of radiation rights optimizing the level
of destructive interference even with no legislation at all.
Coase, Ronald H., "The Federal Communications Commission,"
Journal of Law and Economics, II (Oct., 1959). Charles
Jackson counters th	 he importance of interference-free
radio communications to the safety of maritime operations (the
primary user of radio spectrum in the early part of the century)
and the then relative simplicity of an administrative solution
(prior to an era when billions of dollars could hinge on-the
outcome of a decision, or for that matter, when spectrum was
even noticeably scarce) makes the "press for government monopoly
more understandable." Jackson, Charles L., "Technology for
Spectrum Markets," PH.D. Dissertation, MIT, 1976.
5. Descriptions of the allocation and assignment process appear in
Coase, op. cit., and Robinson, John 0. 9 "An Investigation of
Economic Factors in F.C.C. Spectrum Management," F.C.C. Report
No. SAS 76-01.
6. A discussion of this information overload problem appears in
Robinson, Glen 0., "F.C.C.: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs,"
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, 1978.
7. There are, of course, a number of nontrivial assumptions being
made here about what constitutes "highest value" in a social sense.
However, even when social value is somehow determined to differ
from market price, there are still ways to employ market mecha-
nisms, and their attendant information economies to the distribu-
tion of resources. For a discussion of this problem see Schultz,
Charles, The Public Use of Private Interest, Brookings Institu-
tion, Aug., 1977.
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8. In fact, many view price systems as nothing more than a
highly efficient information system serving to promote
mutually beneficial transactions between parties.
9. Owen, Bruce M. "Spectrum Allocation: A Survey of Alterna-
tive Methodologies," Office of Telecommunications Policy
Staff Paper, April, 1972.
10. Coase, in a footnote on page 27 of his article (op. cit.
note 4), remarks that his most fundamental complaint is
that certain desirable market transactions are impossible
under current law.
11. Henderson and Quandt, Microeconomic Theory, 2nd ed., p. 279,
McGraw Hil % 1971.
12. Robinson, John 0. "Introduction to Economic Factors into
Spectrum Management," Masters Thesis, p. 28, Annenberg
School of Communications, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1974.
13. Note that opportunity cost minimization is not the same as
accounting cost minimization. The latter is minimized by
zero output whereas the former is not--idle resources have
a positive opportunity cost..
14. Not that I am the first to address them--indeed, many have.
However, no matter how many times they are addressed they
crop up again and again.
15. As used here, "enforcement" includes both detection of a F
violation of somebody's rights, and adjudication for pur-
poses of resolving disputes over rights or punishing
offenders.
16. This crude model is designed only to illustrate a point.
Note that it is not capable of handling the more likely situ-
ation where A's violation of B's right is unintentional. The
simple model could be extended by allowing A either to expend
an amount a to be assured he is violating nobody's rights, or
expend nothing and face probability q that he is violating
somebody's rights. Letting b* be the state of the world in
which A has expended a to be sure that no violations have
occurred, the decision criterion becomes:
U(b*)>(1-q)U(b)+q[(1-p)U(a)+pU(c)I
If a depends on q in an appropriate way (i.e., q>O then a>0
and b*>b) and U(a)>U(b)>U(c)9 then there will always be a p
between 0 and 1 such that for all probabilities greater than
this p, A will expend a to guarantee that he is violating no-
body's rights. If feelings of guilt accompany a violation
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16. (continued)
of somebody else's rights then it may be that U(b)>U(a).
If this were true for everybody in society, then, according
to the simple model, no violations would occur, even if
society spent nothing on detection (o-o). Thus, the social
purpose of guilt may be largely that of keeping enforcement
costs down.
As for the trade-off between detection probability and
punishment, Gary Becker has noted that "a common generali-
zation by persons with Judicial experience is that a change
in the probability has a greater effect on the number of
offenses than a change in the punishment. . .," Becker,
Gary S. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy, pp. 169-217, March-April, 1968.
17. DeVany, Arthur S., Eckert, Ross D., Meyers, Charles J.,
O'Hara, Donald J., & Scott, Richard C. "A Property System
for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic-Spectrum: A
Legal-Economic-Engineering Study," Stanford Law Review,
XXI, pp. 1499-1561, June, 1969.
18,, Dunn, Donald A., & Owen, Bruce M. "Policy Options in Mobile
Radio Spectrum Management, Report to the F.C.C., Sept., 1978.
19. Reinhart, Edward E. "Orbit-Spectrum Sharing Between the
Fixed-Satellite and Broadcasting-Satellite Services with Appli-
cations to 12 GHz Domestic Systems," NASA Report R-1463,_p. 189,
May, 1974.
20. For example, ;,Ieinhart's report, previously noted.
21. Jackson, Charles L. "Technology for Spectrum Markets," Ph.D.
Thesis, p. 71 ff., MIT, 1976.
22. Ibid 21.
23. How negotiations of this kind might be effected is extensively
described in the article by DeVany, Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara., and
Scott, referred to in note 17.
24. Russell, S. P., & Lusignan, B. B. "A Techno-Economic Approach
to U.S. Domestic Satellite Orbit-Spectrum Regulation," IEEE
Compatibility, Vol. EMC-19, No. 3, p. 351, ,Aug., 1977.
25. This approach is discussed in detail by Jackson in "Technology
for Spectrum Markets," op..cit. note 21.
38
26. For those to whom this seems too "far out," I would,
only point out that the same could have been said 100
years ago about the idea that apportionment of deep
seabed resources would someday become the politically
heated issue it has in fact become in recent delibera-
tions at the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea.
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